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NOTE 
CALIFORNIA'S FOUL STRIKE: 
A SINGLE ACT PUNISHED WITH 
TWO STRIKES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 14, 1998, the California Supreme Court decided 
People v. Benson, l holding that prior convictions arising from 
the same transaction may each be counted as "strikes" under 
the Three Strikes law, even if the defendant did not receive a 
sentence for one of the convictions. 2 The court stated that its 
conclusion was consistent with the plain language of the Three 
Strikes law as well as the history and legislative intent behind 
the law.3 As a result of this decision, defendants can now po-
tentially receive three strikes from one incident. 4 
Section II of this Note fll'st provides an overview of the 
Three Strikes law, and explains how a court determines sen-
tence enhancement under the Three Strikes law. Sections III, 
IV, and V describe the facts, procedural history, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's rationale for upholding the appellate 
court's decision. Section VI of this Note critiques People v. 
Benson, and the majority's conclusion that the language of the 
Three Strikes law is sufficiently explicit to allow enhancement 
of a sentence based on a conviction stayed pursuant to a statu-
1. 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998). 
2. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 565 (Cal. 1998). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. at 570. 
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tory prohibition against' punishing an act or omission under 
more than one penal provision. Section VI also compares the 
Supreme Court's holding in People v. Benson with its holding in 
People v. Romero,5 and critiques the amount of discretion 
awarded to the trial court. Filially, Sections VII and VIII con-
clude that danger lies in relinquishing discretion to the trial 
court, as it remains unclear whether voters intended that an 
act that may only be punished once could generate two strikes. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW 
During the last decade, many states enacted multiple of-
fense statutes in response to rising crime rates. 6 These "Three 
Strikes laws" provide aggravated penalties for recidivist of-
fenders. 7 Both California's legislature and the electorate en-
acted versions of a Three Strikes law.8 California's Three 
Strikes law is a two-tiered plan, which focuses on both two and 
three time convicted felons. 9 Under the law, a defendant's sen-
tence may be enhanced by prior convictions, otherwise known 
as "strikes."lo Yet the California Supreme Court recently de-
creased the strength of the Three Strikes law in People v. Ro-
mero,l1 ruling that a trial court retains discretion to dismiss 
strikes if the court determines that it is in the furtherance of 
justice. 12 
5. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
6. See Angie Cannon, 3-Strikes Laws Swing and Miss, Survey Indicates, DENY. 
POST, Sept. 10, 1996. at Al. 
7. See Franklin E. Zimring, Essay, Populism, Democratic Government, and the De-
cline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on 'Three Strikes' in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 
243,245 (1996). 
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999) & CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 
(West Supp. 1999). "Three Strikes Law" is used in this article to describe both the 
statute adopted by the legislature, 1994 Cal. Stat. Ch. 12, sec. 1 (AB 971) (enacting 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999», and the initiative, Proposition 184, 
adopted by the electorate in a general election on Nov. 8, 1994 (enacting CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999». 
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999). 
10. See id. 
11. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
12. See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996). See infra notes 56-72 and 
accompanying text for discussion of People v. &mero. 
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A CREATION OF THE THREE STRIKES LAW 
Multiple offense statutes imposing heightened sentences for 
repeat offenders have a long history in the United StateS. 13 In 
recent years a demand for such laws has grown in reaction to 
rising crime rates, violent gang-related crimes, children carry-
ing guns, crimes committed by recidivists, and children being 
targeted by gun dealers. 14 In response to this public alarm 
against violent crime, many states enacted multiple offense 
statutes during the 1990's.15 
In response to the senseless murder of his eighteen-year-old 
daughter, Kimber Reynolds, Mike Reynolds proposed Califor-
nia's fIrst version of a multiple offense statute. 16 His version of 
Three Strikes differed from the other proposals being debated 
across the country in three respects. 17 First, he proposed that 
signifIcant sentencing enhancements should be imposed upon 
conviction for a second felony. 18 Second, Reynolds proposed 
that a criminal should receive a twenty-fIve year to life sen-
13. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400 (1997). American legislatures have enacted statutes en-
hancing punishment for repeat offenders since 1796. See id. 
14. See Chuck Lindell et aI., The Spark of Fear, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 15, 
1991, at AI. 
15. See Angie Cannon, 3-Strikes Laws Swing and Miss, Suroey Indicates, DENV. 
POST, Sept. 10, 1996, at AI. In 1993, Washington was the only state to enact three 
strikes legislation. In 1994, twelve states enacted three strikes legislation: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In 1995, nine states enacted three 
strikes legislation: Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. See id. See also Diane Jennings, Bruce Tomaso, 
Society to Face Rising Costs of Aging Prison Population, Experts Wonder Whether Texas 
System can Seep up as Inmate Numbers Swell under Long-term Sentencing, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at AI. In 1995, both Oklahoma and Texas enacted 
three strikes legislation. See id. 
16. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade &rn from Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
1993, at A3. One evening in 1992, Kimber had just finished having dinner with a 
friend, and was getting into her car when two men drove up on a stolen motorcycle. 
One grabbed for her purse, and as she struggled with him, she was fatally shot. The 
killer was a parolee, and was wanted for a series of robberies and assaults. See id. See 
Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, Mike Reynolds Vowed that His Murdered 
Daughter Would Not Die in Vain; Few Thought He Would Win, But Today He Will See 
the 'Three Strikes' Bill Signed Into Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at AI. 
17. See Zimring, supra note 7, at 245. 
18. See id. 
3
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tence for his second felony even in the absence of violence. 19 
Finally, Reynolds proposed that the third strike could be gen-
erated by any felony conviction under the California Penal 
Code.20 
Initially, Reynolds' Three Strikes package received little 
support from the general public.21 Ultimately, however, the 
1993 murder of twelve-year old Polly Klaas ended the public's 
apathy and indecisiveness regarding California's multiple of-
fense statute.22 Recently paroled from the state prison, a twice-
convicted violent offender abducted Polly from her Petaluma 
home.23 Sadly, Polly's murder was the turning point in ob-
taining the necessary signatures to put Reynolds' Three Strikes 
bill on the California ballot. 24 Additional support for the Three 
Strikes bill arose when President Clinton signed the Violent 
Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the federal version of 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. See Michael Krikorian, Striking up a Debate, THE FRESNO BEE, July 27, 1998, 
at B1. Currently twenty-four states have some form of three strikes legislation in 
place. California is the only state that does not require the third offense to be a major 
crime. See id. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born {rom Pain, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 1993, at A3. Mike Reynolds, Kimber's father, was the driving force behind 
California's three strikes bill, targeted at career criminals. Reynolds initially had 
difficulty in obtaining enough signatures to add the bill to the California ballot. See id. 
22. See Tupper Hull, State's Parole System Attacked: Many Wonder Why Davis, 
With Long Record, Was Free - The Polly Klaas Kidnapping, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, 
Dec. 5,1993, at AI. Richard Allen Davis had been in and out of prison since he was 19 
years of age. He had six convictions prior to the murder, ranging from burglary to 
assault with a deadly weapon. See id. See Richard Price, Town Angry at a System that 
Failed, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at lA. Davis' rap sheet was 11 pages long, including 
two prior kidnapping convictions. In his most recent stay in prison-a 16-year sen-
tence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary-he had served only half of his sentence 
before early release for good behavior. Davis would have been in jail on the day Polly 
Klaas was abducted if he had served his entire sentence. See id. 
23. See Hull, supra note 22, at AI. 
24. See id. See David B. Magleby & Kelly D. Patterson, Consultants and Direct 
Democracy, POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS, June 1, 1998, Vol. 31, No.2. Use of the 
baseball slogan, "Three Strikes and you're out!" also played an important role in in-
creasing the public awareness and support for the three strikes sentencing legislation. 
The phrase "three strikes, and you're out" has been credited with attracting support to 
the three strikes movement. See id. 
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the Three Strikes legislation.25 The federal Act imposes life 
sentences for a third violent felony conviction. 26 
In March 1994, California Governor Pete Wilson signed 
Reynolds' Three Strikes program into law. 27 California voters 
approved an identical version of the bill, state Proposition 184, 
in November 1994.28 The current version of the Three Strikes 
law specifies punishment for persons who commit any subse-
quent felony and have one or more prior violent or serious fel-
ony convictions. 29 
B. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1170.12 
The purpose of California's Three Strikes law is to "[e]nsure 
longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who 
commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious 
and/or violent felony offenses. »30 The Three Strikes law is de-
signed to provide a "no questions asked" policy in sentencing a 
25. See Sam Vincent Meddis, All 3 Candidates Talking Tough, USA TODAY, Oct. 
26, 1992, at lOA. See 18 U.S.C § 3559(c) (1990 & Supp. 1999). Section 3559(c) pro-
vides: 
[d. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in a 
court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment if-{A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions 
have become fmal) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States 
or of a State of-{i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or (ii) one or more 
serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses; and (B) each 
serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing 
under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the 
defendant's conviction of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug 
offense. 
26. See id. 
27. See Stuart Pfeifer, Second Chances vs. 'Three Strikes' Law, THE ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 26, 1997, at AI. This bill is codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 
28. See id. This proposition is codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12. 
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 
(West Supp. 1999). 
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999) (as stated in the statement of 
intent preceding the text of § 1170.12 in Prop. 184). The California Penal Code cur-
rently contains two similar provisions regulating sentencing impositions for persons 
convicted of a felony, who have previously committed one or more "violent" or "serious" 
felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12. Because both statutes are nearly identi-
cal, for purposes of this Note, all references made hereinafter to California's three 
strikes legislation are to California Penal Code section 1170.12. Section 1170.12 is the 
initiative version, which was in effect when the defendant committed the crime in the 
present case. See id. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558 (1998). 
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career criminal to life imprisonment for a third felony convic-
tion.3l The Three Strikes law authorizes lengthy prison sen-
tences for defendants with at least one prior violent or serious 
felony conviction who are found guilty of any subsequent fel-
ony.32 
The version of the Three Strikes law enacted by the elector-
ate is codified in section 1170.12 of the California Penal Code. 33 
Section 1170.12 is a two-tiered plan, which enhances the sen-
tence of criminals convicted of two or three felonies. 34 The sen-
tence enhancement provisions' are triggered only when a prior 
conviction is classified as a strike.35 Under section 1170.12(b), 
a strike is a "serious" or "violent" felony identified in the sta~­
ute.36 The statute enumerates nineteen violent felonies, which 
qualify as strikes including: murder, home robbery and rape.37 
31. Peter H. King, That Grinding Sound, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13. 1994, at A3. 
32. See id. § 1170.12. See Steve Lawrence, Lawmakers Refuse to Narrow List of 
Felonies for '3 Strikes: Senate: 10 Democrats Join A Vote to Sink the Proposal. A 
Prison Population Boom is Feared and Disputed, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 
5, 1997, at A4. Since its enactment in 1994, the Three Strikes law has been subject to 
much criticism and debate. One of the largest debates has been over the type of prior 
conviction that will produce an enhanced sentence under the Three Strikes law. Oppo· 
nents believe that the law's punishment often does not fit the crime. These opponents 
propose that the Three Strikes law should be limited to only violent and serious felo-
nies, arguing that only twenty-five percent of second strikers and fifty percent of third 
strikers were committed to prison for a serious or violent offense. See id. See Assembly 
Committee on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on 
Judiciary, Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal Review, 1997-1998 Legis., June 
30, 1998 (statement of Judith M. Garvey). In response to these arguments, the Cali-
fornia Senate proposed a bill that would limit enhanced punishment under the Three 
Strikes law to persons who are convicted of a violent or serious felony and also have 
two or more prior violent or serious felony convictions. Supporters of Senate Bill 2048 
noted that possession of controlled substances, petty theft with a prior, and second 
degree burglary are the most common commitment offenses for second strikers; tht:) 
most common offenses for third strikers are burglary, robbery, and pOBsession of con-
trolled substances. See id. 
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999). 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. Id. § 1170.12(b)(1)(A-B). Section 1170.12(b) provides that "[nlotwithstanding 
any other provision oflaw ... a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) Any 
offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense 
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state." Id. 
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1999). Section 667.5 lists the 
following felonies as "violent": Murder; Voluntary Manslaughter; Mayhem; Rape; Sod-
omy or Oral copulation by force, or fear; Lewd acts committed on a child under the age 
of 14; any felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any felony in which the defen-
dant inflicts great bodily injury on a victim; any felony in which the defendant uses a 
6
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The statute also identifies thirty-four serious felonies which 
qualify as strikes, including all violent felonies, attempts to 
commit violent felonies, residential burglary and some drug 
sales to minors.38 Furthermore, section 1170.12(b) mandates 
that a stay of execution of sentence does not affect the classifi-
cation of a prior conviction as a "strike."39 Section 1170.12 re-
quires the prosecuting attorney to plead and prove each prior 
felony conviction.40 Moreover, plea-bargaining is not allowed 
firearm; any robbery committed with a deadly weapon in an inhabited dwelling or in 
the inhabited portion of any other building; Rape where the act is accomplished against 
the victim's will by force or fear; Attempted murder; Any explosion or attempted explo-
sion of abomb with intent to murder; Kidnapping; Continuous sexual abuse of a child; 
Carjacking if the defendant used a deadly weapon; Any robbery of the first degree 
punishable pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 
213; Conspiracy to rape or attempt to rape. See id. 
38. See id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1999), describes with par-
ticularity those felonies considered "serious": Murder; Attempted Murder; Voluntary 
manslaughter; Mayhem; Rape; Sodomy or Oral Copulation by force or fear; Lewd act on 
a child under the age of 14 years; any felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any 
felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on a victim; any 
felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm; Assault with intent to commit 
rape, mayhem, sodomy, oral copulation, or robbery; Assault with a deadly weapon on a 
peace officer; Assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; Assault with a deadly weapon 
by an inmate; Arson; Exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to 
injure or murder or causing great bodily injury or mayhem; Burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling or inhabited portion of any other building; Robbery or Bank Robbery; Kidnap-
ping; Holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state prison; Attempt to commit a 
felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any felony in which the defendant per-
sonally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; Selling, furnishing, administering, giving, 
or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any serious drug; Rape where 
the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force or fear; Grand theft involving 
a firearm; Carjacking; Continuous sexual abuse of a child; Assault with caustic chemi-
cals or flammable substances; Assault with a deadly weapon on a frreflghter; Conspir-
acy to rape or attempt to rape; Commission of a felony with a frrearm; Any attempt to 
commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than assault. See id. 
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(1)(A-B) (West Supp. 1999). Section 1170.12 
provides that "Inlone of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a 
prior conviction is a prior felony ... (A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or 
sentence. (B) The stay of execution of sentence." Ii A stay is "the act of arresting a 
judicial proceeding by the order of a court." A stay of execution of sentence is "the 
stopping or arresting of execution on a judgment, that is, of the of the judgment-
creditor's right to issue execution, for a limited period." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1413 
(6th ed. 1990). 
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code 
states that "[tlhe prosecuting attorney shall plead and prove each prior felony convic-
tion ... " Id. 
7
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on the second or third strike. 41 However, the prosecution has 
the power to dismiss a strike in the furtherance of justice. 42 
The fIrst level of section 1170.12 affects convicted felons who 
have one prior serious or violent felony conviction on their rec-
ord, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the defendant com-
mitted the previous felony.43 For these offenders, a second con-
viction of any felony results in a sentence double the term pro-
vided as punishment for the new offense.44 The sentence for 
the second felony and the enhancement run consecutively. 45 If 
41. See id. § 1170.12(e). Section 1170.12 requires that "[plrior felony convictions 
shall not be used in plea bargaining, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7 .... n 
Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West Supp. 1999) bars plea bargaining only 
after the filing of an indictment or 'information. Thus, there is no restriction on plea 
bargaining under Penal Code section 1192.7 in the municipal court before the defen· 
dant is held to answer. See id. 
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code 
states that "[tlhe prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony 
conviction allegation in the interest of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, or if 
there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction.n Id. 
43. See id. § 1170. 12(b)(2). Section 1170.12 provides that "[nlothwithstanding any 
other provision of law and for the purposes of this section, a prior conviction of a felony 
shall be defined as ... [al conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if com-
mitted in California, is punishable by imprisonment in state prison .... n Id. 
44. See id. § 1170.12(c)(1). 
45. See id. § 1170.12(a)(6-8). Section 1170.12(a)(6) states that "[ilf there is a cur-
rent conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and 
not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant 
consecutively on each count pursuant to this section." Id. Thus, when II defendant has 
at least one strike, and he or she has been convicted of more than one current felony, 
this section mandates consecutive sentencing on each current felony. Section 
1170.12(a)(7) provides: 
Id. 
If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent felony as 
described in paragraph (6) of this subdivision, the court shall impose the 
sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other 
conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the 
manner prescribed by law. 
Thus, when at least two of the current felonies are "serious or violent: this section 
applies. Finally, section 1170.12(a)(8) states that "[alny sentence imposed pursuant to 
this section will be imposed consecutive to any other sentence which the defendant is 
already serving, unless otherwise provided by law." Id. This section affects cases 
where a defendant is already serving a sentence and then is sentenced under the Three 
Strikes law in a new case. Section 1170.12(a)(8) mandates that the new sentence be 
served consecutively to the prior one. See id. A second sentence is deemed to be con-
secutive "[wlhen one sentence of confinement is to follow another in point of time." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 304 (6th ed. 1990). Yet a sentence is concurrent when "[tlwo 
or more terms of imprisonment, all or part of each term of which is served simultane-
ously and the prisoner is entitled to discharge at the expiration of the longest term 
served.n Id. at 291. 
8
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the second conviction encompasses more than one crime, con-
secutive sentences and enhancements are imposed for each 
conviction.46 For example, if an offender has one prior strike on 
his record for robbery, and commits a new felony of residential 
burglary, he or she would get sentenced to thirteen years m 
prison. 47 
The second level of section 1170.12 applies to felons with 
two or more serious or violent prior felony convictions who then 
commit any subsequent felony.48 However, this section dis-
tinctly differs from the fIrst level in the severity of the sentence 
imposed. 49 Unlike the sentence for the second-time felon, the 
three-time convicted felon's sentence is an indeterminate life 
sentence. 50 The mjnjmum term of the indeterminate life sen-
tence is the greater of three possibilities: three times the sen-
tence for the current felony conviction, state imprisonment for 
twenty-fIve years, or the sentence as determined by the court 
for the current conviction plus any applicable enhancements 
pursuant to section 1170 of the California Penal Code. 51 Thus, 
the third time convicted felon can be assured of being sen-
tenced to a term of at least twenty-fIve years up to life impris-
onment.52 Because the statute calls for the greater penalty, 
however, the third time sentence most often results in life im-
prisonment.53 For example, if a defendant had two prior strikes 
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(7) (West Supp. 1999). 
47. See AL MENASTER & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, 3 STRIKES MANUAL 111 (Compen-
dium Press 1996). If the sentencing court chose a mid-term sentence of four years for 
the new burglary conviction, twice this amount is eight years. Then, with the dual use 
of the enhancement for the "serious felony" prior of five years, the defendant would 
ultimately receive a thirteen-year sentence. See id. 
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
49. Seeid. § 1170.12. 
50. See id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A). 
51. See id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i-iii). 
52. Seeid. § 1170.12. 
53. See Lisa Cowert, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: 
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 624 (1998) (dis-
cussing the policy concerns intertwined with the Three Strikes law and advocating 
rehabilitation rather than retribution). See Assembly Committee on Public Safety: 
Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary, Criminal Procedure 
and Budget and Fiscal Review, 1997-1998 Legis., June 30, 1998 (statement of Judith 
M. Garvey). The Three Strikes law has been subject to a large amount of debate be-
cause most offenders with two or more "strikes" receive a sentence of life imprison-
ment, even if they did not commit a violent or serious crime. See id. See Steven 
9
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for robbery and residential burglary, and then committed a 
third strike, another residential burglary, under the Three 
Strikes law he or she must spend 25 years in prison before be-
ing eligible for parole. 54 
Since its enactment, the Three Strikes law has been subject 
to much judicial review to determine the scope of the law. In 
one such case, the Three Strikes law has been interpreted as 
giving trial courts discretion to strike felony convictions of de-
fendants eligible for sentencing under the sentence enhance-
ment scheme.65 
Pressman & Jennifer Kaae, The Law was Intended to Send a Clear Message to &peat 
Criminals - But No One Agrees what the Message is, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Oct. 1996, at 
38. The outrage over the current configuration of the Three Strikes law has been ag-
gravated by particular cases popularized by the media. For example, in Riverside a 
homeless man received a sentence oftwenty-nine years to life when he was convicted of 
shoplifting cologne samples, a razor kit and a flashlight from K-Mart. The defendant's 
other strikes consisted of two robberies in the 1970s and a residential burglary in 1987. 
In another case, a 27- year old man received his third strike when he stole a slice of 
pepperoni pizza. Before the pizza escapade, the man had been convicted of robbery, 
attempted robbery, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and possession of a controlled 
substance. Under California's Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to a mandatory 
twenty-five years to life. See id. See also Michael J. Daponde, Parolees No Longer 
Walk Following Serious Felonies - Incarceration Mandatory, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
552,555 (1998). 
54. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 113-114. Under Penal Code 
section 1170.12(c)(2)(i), three times the court selects for the current offense (the resi-
dential burglary which carries a high term of six years), would be eighteen years if the 
court selected the high term. Under subdivision (c)(2)(iii), the base term for the new 
offense in this example, six years, would be added to all enhancements under Penal 
Code section 1170 (two "serious felony" priors which each carry a five-year term), ten 
years, equaling sixteen years. Because the twenty-five year sentence provided in sub-
division (c)(2)(ii) is greater than 18 or 16 years, this defendant must spend twenty-five 
years in prison before being eligible for parole plus a consecutive determinate sentence 
of ten years for dual use of the priors. See id. See Little Hoover Commission Report, 
Jan. 1998, p. 14. Critics project that the state of California will be forced to build new 
prisons or release other inmates unless the Three Strikes law is scaled back. Statistics 
indicate that the total state prison population will increase substantially in the coming 
years, in large part because of the Three Strikes law. See id. See Assembly Committee 
on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary, 
Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal &view, 1997-1998 Legis., June 30, 1998 
(statement of Judith M. Garvey). The Three Strikes law has been criticized for not only 
clogging the prisons, but also the court system. The backlog of felony criminal cases has 
pushed misdemeanor and low-level felony cases out of court, as well as civil cases in 
some jurisdictions. See id. 
55. See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996). 
10
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C. PEOPLE V. ROMERO: NARROWING OF THE THREE STRIKES 
LAw 
Until recently, a court's discretion in sentencing a repeat 
offender was limited. 56 The Three Strikes law specifically em-
powered the prosecution to move to dismiss a strike or strike a 
prior felony conviction allegation "in the furtherance of jus-
tice."57 However, the law remained unclear on whether it 
granted the courts the same power to dismiss. 58 
In People v. Romero,59 the California Supreme Court exam-
ined whether a trial court may, sua sponte, strike prior felony 
convictions in cases arising under California's Three Strikes 
laws. 60 The Romero court ruled that a trial court retains dis-
cretion to dismiss one or more prior felony convictions, or 
56. See Cowert, supra note 53, at 624. Until the Romero decision, the Three 
Strikes law removed sentencing discretion from the judiciary in sentencing habitual 
offenders, and instead granted the discretion to the prosecutor, forcing a standoff be· 
tween the judiciary and the legislature over sentencing discretion. See id. 
57. CAL. PENAL CODE §.1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
58. See id. 
59. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
60. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 630. Romero was charged with second degree bur-
glary in violation of California Penal Code § 459, attempted burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling in violation of Penal Code §§ 459, 664, first degree burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling in violation of Penal Code § 459, and possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of Health and Safety Code § 11350. Romero's two prior serious felonies of 
burglary and attempted burglary convictions qualified as "strikes" under the Three 
Strikes law, making him a third time offender eligible for a life sentence under the 
second level of the statute. Romero originally plead not guilty. See id. at 632. How-
ever, the trial judge offered to dismiss the Romero's prior convictions for three strikes 
purposes if he changed his plea. The court subsequently struck Romero's prior felony 
convictions and imposed a six-year sentence as opposed to the sentence of life impris-
onment mandated under the Three Strikes law. The district attorney petitioned for a 
writ of mandamus to vacate the judge's order, arguing that the express language of the 
Three Strikes law did not grant the judge the power to dismiss prior felony allegations 
except when requested by the prosecution. The Court of Appeal determined that the 
trial court could not dismiss prior felony convictions on its own motion. The appellate 
court ordered the trial court to vacate the sentence and permit the defendant to with-
draw his plea. The California Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for 
review. Reversing in part, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may dismiss prior 
felony convictions in furtherance of justice on its own motion in a case brought under 
the Three Strikes law. See id. at 630. An information is "an accusation exhibited 
against a person for some criminal offense, without an indictment ... [~rl without the 
intervention of a grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). A writ of 
mandamus "[clommand[sl the performance of a particular act therein specified ... or 
directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he has been 
illegally deprived." [d. at 961. 
11
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strikes, if the trial court concludes that it is "in furtherance of 
justice. »61 
The court focused on Penal Code section 1385(a), which 
grants the court the general power to strike prior convictions in 
furtherance of justice. 62 The Supreme Court stated that unless 
the legislature clearly intended to eliminate the power granted 
to the courts under Penal Code section 1385(a), California's 
Three Strikes statutes should not be read as abolishing a trial 
court's power to dismiss strikes in three strikes cases. 63 The 
court reasoned that the legislature would not have included a 
provision in the Three Strikes law that allows the prosecuting 
attorney to strike a prior felony conviction pursuant to 1385 
unless it also intended that the court retain its power under 
section 1385.64 Thus, the Romero court ruled that trial courts 
may exercise the power to dismiss strikes at any time, before 
trial or after trial, but suggested that it might be most appro-
priate at sentencing.65 
61. Romero, 917 P.2d at 629. 
62. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 632. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West Supp. 1999). 
Section 1385 provides that: 
[d. 
(a) The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon 
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an 
action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an 
order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause 
which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading. (b) This 
section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious 
felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667. 
63. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 640. 
64. See id. at 642. 
65. See id. at 648. See People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998). However, the 
California Supreme Court has further defined what a trial court should consider in . 
deciding whether to dismiss a strike "in furtherance of justice." In ruling whether to 
strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding 
under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, "in furtherance of justice" pursuant to 
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must 
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and 
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, 
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in 
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had presently not commit· 
ted one or more felonies and/or had not previously been convicted of one or more serio 
ous and/or violent felonies. See id. 
12
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However, the court also cited several examples of when the 
court might abuse this discretion.66 The court warned that a 
dismissal of a strike must truly be in the furtherance of jus-
tice.67 Specifically, the Romero court held that the trial court 
may not strike prior convictions solely for judicial convenience, 
court congestion, a judge's hostility to the Three Strikes law, or 
because the defendant pleads guilty.68 The court's decision was 
fully retroactive. 69 
The Three Strikes law has now taken a new tum in Califor-
nia with the problem of determining whether two strikes can 
arise from one act, even though one of the convictions was 
stayed pursuant to the prohibition on multiple punishment. 70 
The California Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Benson71 is 
the first decision on how the Three Strikes law affects such 
cases, and its repercussions are sure to affect scores of criminal 
defendants throughout the state of California. 72 
66. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 648-649. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 648. See Dan Morain, Assembly OKs Bill Limiting Judges' 3-Strikes 
Leniency Legislature. L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1996, at AI. The California legislature 
reacted immediately to Romero with the General Assembly's passage of Senate Bill 
331, which curtailed judicial discretion by barring the judiciary from dismissing prior 
felony conviction allegations for violent felonies. See id. See S.B. 331, 1996-1997 Legis. 
(Cal. 1996). Under Senate Bill 3:31, the court has the discretion to strike a defendant's 
prior felony conviction, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney' or upon its own motion 
if three requirements are met. First, none of the defendant's prior convictions could be 
for a violent felony. Second, the defendant's current conviction could not be for a seri-
ous or violent felony. Third, the current offense must have occurred more than five 
years after the defendant's release from custody for the prior felony conviction. See id. 
See Dan Morain & Max Vanzi, Senate Panel Blocks Revisions of 3-Strikes Law, L.A. 
TIMES, July 17, 1996, at AI. However, on July 16, 1996, by a four-to-one vote, the 
Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted against sending the bill to the Senate 
floor, denying any opportunity for a full Senate hearing on the bill. In rejecting the bill 
the Committee cited confusing language and concern over the fact that eighty percent 
of felons sentenced under Three Strikes laws are nonviolent as the primary factors. 
See id. 
70. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A. 
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI. 
71. Benson, 954 P.2d at 557. 
72. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A. 
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI. 
13
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III. FACTS OF PEOPLE v. BENSON 
In 1979, Russell Benson went to a neighbor's apartment un-
der the guise of borrowing her vacuum cleaner.73 After he re-
turned the vacuum, he went back to the apartment a second 
time, claiming he forgot his keys.74 Once inside her apartment, 
Benson grabbed the victim from behind, struggled with her and 
forced her to the floor.75 Benson then proceeded to stab her ap-
proximately twenty times over her entire body with a knife. 76 
Miraculously, the victim survived the attack and was able to 
identify Benson as her attacker.77 The victim undelwent four 
major surgeries and was severely scarred as a result of the at-
tack. 78 The police discovered a knife and bloody clothing in 
Benson's apartment and arrested him for the crimes committed 
against his neighbor. 79 
Subsequently, a jury convicted Benson of residential bur-
. glary and assault with intent to commit murder.80 Benson was 
also found to have used a knife during the commission of a fel-
ony and inflicted great bodily injury to the victim in commis-
sion of the crimes. 81 On October 16, 1980, the trial court sen-
73. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558 (Cal. 1998). 
74. See id. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. See CAL PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code ~tates 
that "[e)very person who enters any house, room, apartment ... store, ... with intent to 
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." Id. See CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 217 (West 1988). Law of Jan. I, 1981, repealed by Stats. 1980, ch. 300, § 2, p. 
628. Benson was originally convicted for assault with intent to commit murder pursu-
ant to Penal Code section 217. However, section 217 was repealed in 1980. Id. See 
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West Supp. 1999). Section 664 of t.he Penal Code 
provides that "[iJf the crime attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon conviction of the offense 
attempted." Id. 
81. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(b)(1) (West Supp. 
1999). Section 12022(b) provides: 
Any person who personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that 
felony or attempted felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment 
prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been 
convicted, be punished by an additional term of one year, unless use of a 
14
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tenced Benson to state prison for ten years for the residential 
burglary charge.82 However, Benson's sentence for the assault 
with intent to commit murder was stayed.83 After serving five 
years, Benson was released on parole from state prison on Sep-
tember 12, 1985.84 
Nine years later on November 30, 1994, while shopping in a 
discount store, Benson stuffed several packages of cigarettes in 
his pockets and in the sleeves of his jacket and walked out of 
the store without paying for them.85 Having observed Benson's 
actions, security personnel tried to detain him outside of the 
store but Benson fled.86 The security guards caught up with 
Benson, however, and ultimately arrested him. 87 The total 
value of the merchandise Benson stole was twenty dollars. 88 
Benson was charged with second degree robbery, second de-
gree burglary, and petty theft with a prior conviction based 
upon the 1979 incident. 89 A jury found Benson guilty of petty 
[d. 
[d. 
deadly or dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of which he or she 
was convicted. 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 8upp. 1999). This section states: 
Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other 
than an accomplice in the commission or attempted commission of a felony 
shall, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony 
or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be punished by an 
additional term of three years, unless infliction of great bodily injury is an 
element of the offense of which he or she is convicted. 
82. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed 
Dec. 29, 1997). 
83. See id. See supra note 39 for a definition of a stay. 
84. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
85. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed 
Dec. 29, 1997). 
86. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed Oct. 
29, 1997). 
87. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed 
Dec. 29, 1997). 
88. See w. 
89. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct. 
29, 1997). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988), which states "Irlobbery is the felo· 
nious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or im-
medi"ate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.n [d. 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1999). See supra note 80 for definition of 
burglary. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West Supp. 1999). Section 666 states in part: 
Every person who, having been convicted of ... burglary ... and having served 
a term therefor in any penal institution or having been imprisoned therein as 
15
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theft with a prior conviction, not guilty of robbery, and was 
deadlocked on the burglary count.90 The court coWlted Ben-
son's 1980 burglary and assault with intent to commit murder 
convictions as two prior strikes under California's Three 
Strikes law.91 During sentencing, the trial court considered 
Benson's 1994 conviction of petty theft with a prior to be his 
third strike and sentenced him to state prison for twenty-five 
years to life.92 Had his earlier conviction been considered only 
as one strike, Benson would have faced a maxnnum six-year 
sentence.93 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Benson requested that the trial court review his sentence 
for the 1994 discount store incident and strike the prior convic-
tion allegations, arguing that the court violated the proscrip-
tion against double punishment contained within Penal Code 
section 654 by counting each 1980 conviction as a strike.94 The 
[d. 
a condition of probation for that offense, is subsequently convicted of petit 
theft, then the person convicted of that subsequent offense is punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison. 
90. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct. 
29, 1997). 
91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
667.5(c)(8), (12) (West Supp. 1999). Assault with intent to commit murder is a violent 
felony. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(8), (9), (18), (23) (West Supp. 1999). 
Residential burglary is a serious felony, and assault with intent to commit murder is 
also a serious felony. Each one of these crimes is a qualifying prior felony conviction 
for the purposes of the Three Strikes law. See id. 
92. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 557. 
93. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A. 
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI. 
94. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal. 1998). Benson claimed that the 
trial court erred in counting both the burglary and assault with intent to commit mur-
der counts from the 1980 convictions as separate strikes under California's Three 
Strikes law. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1999). Section 654 of the 
Penal Code provides that: "[aln act or omission that is punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of law shall be punished ... but in no case shall the !Ict or omission 
be punished under more than one provision." [d. When a defendant is convicted or 
pleads guilty to two or more crimes section 654 bars multiple punishment for the same 
act. See id. See People v. Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The 
purpose of section 654 is to prevent multiple punishment for single a(:t or omission, 
even though that act or omission violates more than one statute and thus constitutes 
more than one crime. Although distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and 
may result in multiple verdicts of guilt, trial courts may impose sentence for only one 
offense. On the other hand, multiple punishment is proper if the evidence discloses 
16
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trial court found no violation of section 654, however, and de-
nied the defendant's motion to strike his prior convictions. 95 
The court stated it lacked the authority to strike a prior convic-
tion allegation. The court also refused to reduce the petty theft 
conviction to a misdemeanor.96 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
judgment.97 The appellate court determined that Benson's 
prior burglary conviction could be used counted both as a prior, 
elevating the petty theft conviction to a felony, and as a strike 
under California's Three Strikes law.98 The court also held that 
Benson's prior offenses that were part of the same incident 
could be separate strikes under the Three Strikes law. 99 The 
appellate court then remanded the case to allow the trial court 
to exercise its discretion to strike one of the prior conviction 
allegations as permitted in People v. Romero.1oo 
that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of 
and not merely incidental to each other. See id. See Neal v. State of California, 357 
P.2d 839, 843-844 (Cal. 1960). The California Supreme Court defined a test to deter-
mine what is an indivisible course of conduct: 
[wlhether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to 
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent 
and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, 
the defendant may be punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more 
than one. 
[d. In Neal, the separate punishment imposed on the defendant for arson could 
not stand because the objective of the offense was to commit the two attempted 
murders. Because there were two individual intents separate punishments were 
proper. See id. 
95. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. 
96. See Appellant's Petition for Review, People v. Benson, No .. S061678 (filed May 
27, 1997). 
97. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
98. See id. The Court of Appeal first noted that Penal Code section 654 bars mul-
tiple punishment for the same act. See id. at 699. The appellate court then recognized 
the holding in People v. Pearson, which held that when a defendant is convicted or 
pleads guilty to two or more crimes, and section 654 would bar multiple punishment for 
the crimes, the crimes may not be used as separate priors in subsequent proceedings. 
See People v. Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 600-601 (Cal. 1986). The Pearson court held that 
this rule applies unless the legislature explicitly states that subsequent action may be 
based on the stayed convictions. See id. Yet the Benson court rejected the defendant's 
contention that the Three Strikes law is ambiguous. See Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
699-700. The court stated the language was clear, and they need go no further than 
the language of the statute. See id. 
99. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
100. See id. (citing People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996». In Romero, the 
court ruled that a trial court retains discretion to strike one or more prior felony con-
17
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Benson appealed to the California Supreme Court, ques-
tioning whether multiple felonies could be punished as sepa-
rate strikes when they arose from a single criminal act. 101 Ben-
son contended that the trial court erred by treating his 1980 
convictions as two strikes, arguing that his burglary and as-
sault with intent to commit murder convictions compromised a 
single act against a single victim and were contemporaneously 
committed with a single intent. 102 Because the 1980 convictions 
were punished as a single crime pursuant to Penal Code sec-
tion 654, Benson argued that the crimes should not individu-
ally be counted as strikes. 103 The California Supreme Court 
granted review. 104 
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Benson, the majority of the California Supreme Court 
held that prior convictions arising from the same set of facts 
should each be counted as strikes for purposes of sentencing 
under the Three Strikes law, even if the sentence on one of the 
prior convictions was stayed. 105 The dissent vehemently dis-
agreed, contending that the majority overturned decades of 
case law designed to protect against multiple punishment for a 
single act. 106 The dissent recognized that the' purpose of Penal 
Code section 654 was to prevent multiple punishment for the 
same act, and argued that the majority violated this proscrip-
tion by counting Benson's 1980 burglary and assault with in-
tent to commit murder as two separate strikes. 107 
victions, if the trial court concludes that it is "in furtherance of justice." Romero, 917 
P.2d at 630. 
101. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557. 
102. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 199'1). 
103. See id. 
104. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557. 
105. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J.; Baxter, J.; Brown, J. con-
curring). Chief Justice George wrote the opinion for the majority. See id. at 564. 
106. See id. (Chin, J; Mosk, J.; Werdegar, J. dissenting). Justice Chin wrote the 
opinion for the dissent. See id. at 571. 
107. See id. at 564. 
18
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In Benson, the California Supreme Court determined that 
Benson's prior felony convictions for residential burglary and 
assault with intent to commit murder counted as two strikes 
rather than as one strike. 108 The court fIrst analyzed the plain 
language of the Three Strikes law, section 1170.12, and deter-
mined that a stay of execution of sentence pursuant to Penal 
Code section 654 did not affect consideration as a prior convic-
tion or a strike. l09 Additionally, the court reviewed the legisla-
tive history and purpose of the Three Strikes law and held that 
the legislature intended to count prior convictions as strikes. 110 
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court upheld Benson's 
conviction of twenty-fIve years to life. lll 
1. Statutory Interpretation: Determining What is a "Strike" 
To determine whether Benson had one or two strikes, the 
majority mst looked to the plain meaning of the sentence en-
hancement law, Penal Code section 1170.12.112 The court ex-
amined whether the legislature explicitly declared that subse-
quent penal or administrative action could be based on stayed 
convictions.1I3 Following the appellate court's analysis, the 
court recognized the well settled rule that "[w]hen statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for con-
struction and courts should not indulge in it."1I4 The court 
108. See id. at 558. 
109. See id. The California Supreme Court in Benson decided the case de novo. 
The court reviewed the trial court's determination that the defendant had two prior 
qualifying felony convictions that rendered him subject to sentence as a third strike 
offender. The court analyzed the plain language of the Three Strikes law, and the 
legislative history and purpose of the law. The court held that the trial court had prop-
erly found the defendant as having two prior strikes, and affirmed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal which had also found the Benson to be a third strike offender. See id. 
at 565. When a court is reviewing de novo, it is starting "[alnew; afresh; a second time." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). This means that the court gives no defer-
ence to previous courts' position. See id. 
110. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 559. 
113. See id. at 560. 
114. [d. (quoting People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288 (Cal. 1986)). The Supreme 
Court noted that the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion, recog-
nizing the rule that "[wlhere the statute is clear, courts will not interpret away clear 
19
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noted that section 1170.12(b)(1) expressly provides that a stay 
of execution of sentence "shall not affect the determination of a 
prior conviction. "115 
The court also consid~red its own precedent established in 
People v. Pearson.1I6 In Pearson, the court held that when a 
defendant's guilty plea results in a conviction of two or more 
crimes, and Penal Code section 654 bars multiple punishment 
for the crimes because they are based on the same criminal act, 
the crimes could not be used as separate prior convictions in 
subsequent proceedings.l17 Subsequent penal action, however, 
may be based on the stayed convictions if the legislature ex-
plicitly declares this intent. 118 In Benson, the court concluded 
that the statutory language of the Three Strikes law was suffi-
ciently clear to overcome the general rule of Pearson. 119 The 
legislature had explicitly declared that subsequent penal action 
language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist." Benson, 954 P.2d at 560 (quot-
ing People v. Coronado, 906 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Cal. 1995». The appellate court stated 
that it need go no further than the language used in the Three Strikes law, as the 
language of the statute is clear. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 560. 
115. Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The majority suggested that the dissent's interpreta-
tion of section 1170.12(b)(I) would be to replace the phrase "[t]he stay of execution of 
sentence, except those stays mandated by section 654." Id. The majority then con-
cluded that this proposed construction of the statute does not reflect the meaning that 
the legislature intended. See id. See supra note 39 for the language of Penal Code 
section 1170.12(b). 
116. 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986). 
117. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. See also Pearson, 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986). In 
Pearson, the defendant committed acts of sodomy upon two children. See id. at 596. 
For each of his acts, he was convicted of two offenses, sodomy with a child under 14 
years of age, and lewd conduct. The trial court imposed a sentence for the lewd cOnduct 
convictions, but stayed the sentence on the sodomy convictions, pursuant to Penal Code 
section 654, so the defendant would not be punished twice for the same act. See id. In 
affirming the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of California held .that the 
defendant could not be subjected to future enhancements based on all four of his con-
victions. See id. at 600-601. Instead, the court could only enhance his sentence based 
on convictions where the defendant received an actual sentence, not when it was 
stayed. See id. However, the court noted that the Legislature could explicitly declare 
that subsequent penal or administrative action could be based on stayed convictions. 
See id. at 601. Yet without this declaration, the court was bound by section 654, which 
prohibits a defendant from being disadvantaged as a result of the stayed convictions. 
See id. See supra note 94 for explanation of Penal Code section 654. 
118. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. 
119. See id. at 561. 
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might be based on convictions stayed pursuant to Penal Code 
section 654.120 
The Supreme Court dismissed several arguments that the 
trial court erred by treating Benson as a third strike of-
fender. 121 First, the court addressed the defendant's contention 
that the Three Strikes law cannot overcome the general rule of 
Pearson, because the law does not specifically refer to a stay of 
execution of sentence under section 654.122 The court rejected 
this argument, noting that the Three Strikes law explicitly 
states in its introductory clause that a strike for purposes of 
the' statute "shall be defined" as set forth in §1170.12(b) 
"[n]otwithstanding any other law .... "123 
Second, the court dismissed Benson's argument that inter-
preting the Three Strikes law to include convictions stayed 
pursuant to section 654 would encourage prosecutors to "over-
charge" defendants. 124 In response, the majority noted that its 
holding in Pearson clearly recognized that the Legislature was 
free to adopt a sentencing scheme that abolished the holdings 
of the courts regarding the sentencing of repeat offenders. 125 
Finally, noting that the Three Strikes law did not require 
the electorate to enumerate each type of stay the electorate in-
tended to override, the majority concluded that the defendant's 
argument failed to defer to the language of the Three Strikes 
120. See id. 
121. [d. 
122. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. Benson argued that in order for a sentence that 
is stayed under section 654 to count as a strike, the Three Strikes law should be more 
explicit. See id. Instead the Three Strikes law generally states that the stay of execu-
tion of sentence will not affect what is to be considered as a strike. See CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1170.12(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999). 
123. Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The court determined that this clause prevented the 
Three Strikes law from being limited, and could include any type of stay. The mlijority 
also noted that the initiative version of the Three Strikes law was enacted after Pear-
son, concluding that the provision must be interpreted to include convictions stayed 
pursuant to section 654. See id. 
124. [d. 
125. See id. at 562. The court determined that in enacting the Three Strikes law, 
the electorate abolished the holdings of other courts in accordance with the holding in 
Pearson. See id. 
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law. l26 The Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature and 
the electorate expressly stated that each conviction for a seri-
ous or violent felony should count as a strike regardless of 
whether the prior sentence was stayed. 127 
2. Ballot History and Legislative Intent of the Three Strikes 
Law 
The California Supreme Court next reviewed the history of 
the Three Strikes law and the arguments made in support of 
the legislation before it was enacted. l28 The court recognized 
that ballot arguments accompanying an initiative might be 
considered in determining the electorate's intent in adopting 
the measure. l29 The court observed that neither the 'ballot ar-
guments accompanying the initiative nor the legislative analy-
sis indicated that strikes were limited to convictions that re-
ceived a sentence. l30 The ballot arguments and legislative 
analysis also failed to indicate that strikes could not include 
126. See id. The defendant argued that a stay can arise in a number of contexts 
other than stays granted under section 654. For example stays can be mandatory 
where the term imposed is prohibited by law or exceeds the limitation on the overall 
aggregate term. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 447). 
Also, trial courts allow temporary stays of sentences to permit defendants to get their 
personal affairs in order. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (citing People v. Karaman, 842 
P.2d 100 (Cal. 1992)). 
127. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 560. The court determined that indeed stays do arise 
in contexts other than those granted under section 654, and noted that this fact "em· 
phasizes the great significance that [the court) should accord to the use of broad lan-
guage by the electorate and the Legislature to exclude all stays of execution of sen-
tence, without qualification or exception." Id. at 562. The court also recognized that 
the defendant contended to the rule that "[t)o create an exception [to section 654), the 
other statute need not refer to section 654 explicitly." Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting People v. Hicks, 863 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1993)). In Hicks, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court examined Penal Code section 667.6(c), to determine if it overrode 
p~ovisions in Penal Code section 654. See Hicks, 863 P.2d at 719. Section 667.6(c) 
authorizes consecutive full-term sentences for enumerated sexual offenseEi "whether or 
not the crimes were committed during a single transaction." The Hicks court concluded 
that the legislature did not have to cite section 654 in section 667.6(c) in order to over-
ride section 654. See id. 
128. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562. 
129. See id. (citing People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996)). 
130. See id. at 562. Some ballot arguments reviewed by the majority included: 
"[Serious or violent) [c)onvictions [committed) before 1994 ... are counted as strikes;" 
"[I)f the person has two or more previous serious or violent felony convictions, the 
mandatory sentence for any new felony conviction ... is life imprisonment ... ." Id. 
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prior convictions that had been stayed pursuant to section 
654.131 
The court also focused on the legislative intent behind the 
Three Strikes law. 132 The bill did not expressly require that 
prior convictions be derived from separate criminal acts. l33 The 
court reasoned that if only certain types of stays were to be in-
cluded within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, the elec-
torate or the Legislature could have so indicated. l34 The court 
determined that nothing in the bill suggested that the legisla-
ture intended an exception for prior convictions where the sen-
tence was stayed under section 654.135 Thus, the court con-
cluded that, in light of the electorate and legislative intent, and 
the purpose and objectives underlying the Three Strikes law, 
convictions stayed pursuant to section 654 of the Penal Code 
may count as separate strikes. 136 
The Supreme Court explained the purpose for considering a 
person who committed two crimes against a single victim in a 
single act and received only one sentence as a second strike 
offender. 137 The legislature and the electorate sought to ensure 
that a defendant's prior serious and violent felony convictions 
would count as strikes, despite whatever leniency a court had 
[d. 
131. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562. 
132. See Assembly Bill No. 971, (1993·1994 Reg. Sess.). 
133. See id. at p. 9. The Bill stated: 
This bill does not contain any requirement that the prior offenses be separate. 
Thus, a single act of robbery of three people in a store could result in a 
sentence of twenty·five years to life. Likewise, one case with two counts of a 
serious felony would subject the defendant to a life sentence for any future 
felony. 
134. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563. 
135. See id. (citing People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach), 230 Cal. Rptr. 890, 898 
n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986». In Himmelsbach, the people argued that the language of 
Penal Code section 12311 (which prevented persons who were convicted of certain 
crimes from receiving probation or a suspended sentence) precluded a stay under sec· 
tion 654. However, the Himmelsbach court rejected this contention, stating the legisla· 
ture could have included an exception for sentences stayed under 654, but it did not. 
See Himmelsbach, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 898. Similarly, the Benson court determined that 
if the Three Strikes law was only meant to include certain types of stays, the electorate 
and the legislature could have so indicated. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
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previously afforded the defendant at sentencing.l38 Thus, re-
gardless of whether the violent felony consisted of a single or 
several acts, a repeat felon should be treated as a second strike 
offender. 139 
With legislative goals in mind, the court applied the Three 
Strikes law to the case at bar.140 According to the legislature, 
Benson's two prior felony convictions yielded two strikes. 141 He 
received the benefit of section 654 in his earlier proceeding and 
received a single sentence. 142 Only when Benson reoflEmded did 
he face prolonged incarceration. l43 The court reasoned that the 
Three Strikes law provided Benson with notice that he would 
be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended, and he chose to ig-
nore that notice. 144 Thus, the California Supreme Court treated 
Benson as a second strike offender pursuant to the Legislative 
and electorate intent. 145 
The court rejected Benson's argument that treating a defen-
dant who committed two crimes against a single victim in a 
single act and who received one sentence as a second strike of-
fender is contrary to the principles behind the Three Strikes 
law. 146 The court found that the electorate and Legislature 
138. See id. at 564. 
139. See id. at 563, (citing People v. Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996». In Askey, the defendant contended that the Three Strikes law failed to give 
adequate notice of the specific punishment to be imposed in a third strike case. The 
defendant argued that the law is unclear on how courts are to determine how many 
strikes a defendant has. The court held that the defendant's thirteen prior felony con-
victions provided adequate notice of the penalty to be imposed. See Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 785. 
140. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 564. 
144. See id. The court stated that the Three Strikes law provided Benson with no-
tice that he would be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended. The ml\iority concluded 
that Benson must bear the consequences of his actions since he chose to ignore that 
notice and commit another felony. See id. 
145. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. The court also noted that their analysis does not 
suggest a repeal of section 654, and the opinion should not affect the application of 
section 654 in other contexts. See id. 
146. See id. See also Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 
S061678 (filed Oct. 29, 1997). Benson argued that the purpose of the recidivist statute 
is to punish more severely persons who persist in violating the law. Benson contended 
that if an offender has committed one prior act he or she is eligible for enhanced sen-
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could rationally conclude that a person who had committed ad-
ditional violence during a prior serious felony should be treated 
more harshly than someone who committed the same initial 
felony without the violence. 147 According to the court, Benson 
demonstrated that he posed a more serious threat to public 
safety because of his needless violence in 1979, and now de-
served a harsher sentence. 148 
Finally, the court rejected Benson's assertion that "dramatic 
and harsh results" would result if the court interpreted the 
Three Strikes law as qualifying a prior conviction for a serious 
or violent felony that had been stayed under section 654 as a 
separate strike. 149 The court stated it was not at liberty to alter 
the intended effect of the statute on such grounds. l50 However, 
the court noted that a trial court retains discretion to strike 
one or more prior felony convictions in the interest of justice, 
thereby preventing possible "dramatic and harsh results."151 
After examining the language of section 1170.12 and the 
statute's legislative intent, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that Benson had two strikes, not one. 152 The court re-
manded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the 
tencing as a ~second striker." However, that individual has not committed the repeated 
criminal acts required for the imposition of the harshest sentence provided by the stat-
ute. See id. 
147. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. Examples of criminal acts with additional vio-
lence the court cited included shooting or pistol-whipping a victim during a robbery, or 
assaulting a victim during a burglary. See id. 
148. See id. The court stated that the facts of the present case provide a classic il-
lustration of a criminal act with additional violence: ~in stabbing his victim approxi-
mately 20 times, this defendant demonstrated that he posed a far greater threat to 
public safety than a defendant who has committed a residential burglary without 
committing such gratuitous violence." Id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. (citing People v. Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). The 
Askey court rejected the defendant's claim that a sentence of 25 years to life in prison 
was excessive "because all of his strikes were incurred in a single prior proceeding," 
leaving him only one chance before receiving an indeterminate sentence. Askey, 56 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. 
151. The court noted that in People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996), the 
trial court retains its discretion under Penal Code section 1385. Benson, 954 P.2d at 
564. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West Supp. 1999). Section 1385 states: "[t]he judge 
or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prose-
cuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." Id. 
152. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565. 
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trial court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to strike 
a prior conviction allegation. l53 However, the trial court has 
since reaffirmed Benson's twenty-five year to life sentence, 
rmding that it was not in the interests of justice to strike one of 
his convictions. l54 Benson is now requesting review by the 
Court of Appeal of the trial court's decision. 155 
B. JUSTICE CHIN'S DISSENTING OPINION 
Although Justice Chin agreed with the majority that the de-
fendant was a recidivist and deserved increased punishment 
under the Three Strikes law, he disagreed with the majority's 
holding. l56 Justice Chin believed that the majority's conclusion 
overturned decades of case law designed to protect against 
multiple punishment for a single criminal act. 157 Justice Chin 
first examined the history of section 654 and the procedure 
153. See id. 
154. See Telephone Interview with Russell Babcock, Attorney for Appellant (Jan. 
27, 1999). 
155. See id. 
156. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J; Mosk, J.; Werdegar, J. dissenting). Jus-
tice Chin wrote the opinion for the dissent. See id. at 571. Justice Chin noted that the 
Supreme Court had recently reviewed another Three Strikes case, in which he joined 
the majority's holding. See People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997). In Fuhr-
man, the court held that prior convictions need not have been brought and tried sepa-
rately for each to qualify as a strike. See id. at 1190. Based upon a vehicle theft, in 
1994 the defendant was convicted of robbery and unlawfully driving or taking an 
automobile, and received a weapon enhancement because he used a dangerous weapon 
in the commission of the robbery. However, the defendant had also been previously 
charged with eleven counts of criminal offenses, stemming from an incident in 1989 
where he had an accident in a stolen car and pulled a gun on the victim. See id. at 
1192. From these charges, the defendant subsequently pled guilty to robbery and 
assault with a firearm, and the remaining counts were dismissed. His assault charge 
was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, since the court determined his crime 
was one transaction. After he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law the defen-
dant appealed, arguing since the first two strikes were not brought and tried sepa-
rately, he had only one strike from the 1989 incident. See id. at 1193. The Supreme 
Court concluded that both of the defendant's 1989 convictions qualified as strikes even 
though they were brought and tried separately. See id. at 1200. In Benson, Justice 
Chin noted that the Fuhrman court expressly reserved the issue whether a conviction 
that could not be separately punished may be counted as a strike. However, because of 
the history of section 654, Chin concluded a conviction that may not be separately 
punished does not qualify as a separate strike. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566. 
157. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin argued that 
the majority's decision overturned various cases since the 1960s, which interpreted 
Penal Code section 654. See id. at 566. 
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courts adopted to implement it.l58 He then applied that history 
in his analysis of the relevant portions of the Three Strikes 
law. 159 Justice Chin argued that the majority's holding would 
result in unfavorable consequences, because a defendant could 
now receive three strikes from one incident. l60 Justice Chin 
also argued that interpreting the Three Strikes law as allowing 
one punishment for one act is consistent with the purpose of 
the law and section 654.161 In conclusion, Justice Chin would 
have ruled that Benson had, only one strike and not two. 162 
1. Examination of the History of Section 654 
In his dissent, Justice Chin noted that the original purpose 
of Penal Code section 654 was to guarantee that a defendant 
would not receive multiple punishments for a single act. l63 The 
courts were faced with the task of protecting the defendant 
from multiple punishments without providing the defendant 
with an undeserved windfall. l64 Justice Chin also recognized 
that, although multiple convictions are allowed when a defen-
dant has committed several offenses based on a single act or an 
indivisible course of conduct, multiple punishments are not. 165 
As a result, he argued, the Three Strikes law should not be 
158. See id. at 566-568. 
159. See id. at 568·571. 
160. See id. at 571. 
161. See id. 
162. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571. 
163. See id. at 566 (Chin, J., dissenting). See supra note 94 for the text of Penal 
Code section 654. 
164. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J., dissenting). For example, if a person 
commits a battery with serious bodily injury and felony assault in a single act, and is 
convicted of each crime, section 654 would prohibit multiple punishment. The defen-
dant would be sentenced for felony assault, which proscribes the longest punishment. 
Yet the courts were faced with the dilemma of ensuring that the defendant would not 
be set free if the felony assault charge was dismissed. See id. 
165. See id. Justice Chin relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pearson, 721 
P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986), where the court recognized the general rule that "defendants may 
be charged with and convicted of multiple offenses based on a single act or an indivisi-
ble course of conduct." Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (quoting Pearson, 721 P.2d at 596) 
(Chin, J., dissenting). However, Chin noted, the courts had to decide how to treat mul-
tiple convictions that could be punished but once. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, 
J., dissenting). See supra note 117 for facts and holding of Pearson. 
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read to increase punishment when multiple convictions re-
sulted from one act. 166 
Justice Chin noted that early courts were often inconsistent 
in applying the law. 167 Several courts set aside excess convic-
tions in order to avoid double punishment instead of staying 
the sentence. l68 In People v. Niles,169 the court developed the 
modern procedure of staying the impermissible punishment by 
staying the sentence on the lesser offense. 170 This procedure 
allowed the court to simultaneously convict the defendant of 
multiple offense and avoid multiple punishment. l7l 
166. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. See People v. McFarland, 376 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1962). In McFarland, af-
ter someone detected their stolen vehicle at the defendant's house, the police searched 
the defendant's residence, and discovered stolen articles from several different burgla-
ries. See id. at 451. Even though he received two cOnvictions from one of the incidents, 
the Supreme Court found that a sentence could not be imposed for both because of 
Penal Code section 654's prohibition of punishment for multiple convictions from one 
transaction. See id. at 455. Thus, the court decided to set aside the excess conviction, 
finding "[tlhe appropriate procedure therefore, is to eliminate the effect of the judgment 
as to the lesser offense insofar as the penalty alone is concerned." Id. at 457 .. In Ben· 
son, Justice Chin noted this was the procedure until the modern method of staying the 
impermissible punishment developed. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J., dissent-
ing). 
169. 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964). In Niles, the defendant was convicted of 
burglary and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. See id. at 
13. The Court of Appeal held that pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the defendant 
could not be punished for both the burglary and assault, since they arose from the 
same transaction. In order to avoid double punishment, ·the court stayed the sentence 
on the burglary charge. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the stay of execution 
of sentence, since the defendant's actions constituted an indivisible transaction. See id. 
at 15. 
170. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566. 
171. See id. Justice Chin acknowledged several other cases where the stay proce-
dure had been further developed. See id. In In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1967), the 
defendant was convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, first degree robbery 
of the first victim, and first degree robbery on another victim. See Wright, 422 P.2d at 
999. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences for the kidnapping and robbery of 
the first victim, even though section 654 prohibited multiple punishment because the 
crimes were based on one act. The Supreme Court determined that concurrent sen· . 
tencing would not satisfy section 654, and cited the then new stay procedure of People 
u. Niles as a valid method to satisfy section 654. The court then set aside the sentence 
for the robbery. See Wright, 422 P.2d at 1002. Justice Chin noted the (.'Ontribution to 
the modern stay procedure made in Pearson. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J., 
dissenting). In Pearson, the Supreme Court balanced the potential windfall to the 
defendant in the chance that a conviction might be reversed and the prejudice to him in 
allowing separate sentences for different convictions from a single incident. The court 
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Acknowledging that California courts have followed this 
stay procedure for the last three decades, JustiCe Chin believed 
that the procedure satisfied section 654's mandate that the 
stayed conviction "under no condition, can operate to [defen-
dant's] prejudice."172 Justice Chin asserted that by allowing a 
sentence to be enhanced based on a conviction stayed pursuant 
to section 654, the majority was overturning decades of case 
law and an established sentencing procedure. 173 
2. The Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Pur-
pose of the Three Strikes Law 
In first evaluating the statutory language of section 654, 
Justice Chin recognized that "[s]ection 654 ... is presumed to 
govern every case to which it applies by its terms-unless some 
other statute creates an express exception."174 Justice Chin 
asserted the Three Strikes law did not create an express excep-
tion that would overrule the proscription of double punishment 
in section 654.175 Justice Chin argued that Benson's sentence 
then determined the procedure of staying the sentence instead of reversing. See Pear-
son, 721 P.2d at 599 (citing In re Wright, 422 P.2d at 1001-1002). Justice Chin noted 
that the Pearson court concluded that "[a)ny subsequent sentences imposed on defen-
dant can be enhanced on the basis of the convictions for which he served a sentence; 
but convictions for which service of sentence was stayed may not be so used unless the 
Legislature explicitly declares that subsequent Penal or administrative action may be 
based on such stayed convictions." Justice Chin also noted that the Pearson court 
specifically stated that "if defendant here were subjected to future sentence enhance-
ments based on his stayed convictions, this would also constitute the type of 'incre-
mental punishment' that section 654 forbids." Benson, 954 P.2d at 567 (quoting Pear-
son, 721 P.2d at 601) (Chin, J., dissenting). See supra note 39 for definition of a stayed 
sentence. 
172. Benson, 954 P.2d at 568 (quoting People v. Niles, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1964» (Chin, J., dissenting). 
173. See id. 
174. Id. (quoting People v. Siko, 755 P.2d 294 (Cal. 1988). In Siko, the defendant 
was convicted of three current felonies: rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct with a child, all 
involving the same child in the same incident. The court sentenced the defendant to 
consecutive terms for each of the three felonies. The defendant appealed, arguing that 
he could not be punished separately for all three convictions because he only committed 
two acts under Penal Code section 654. The prosecution argued that section 654's bar 
to multiple punishment was eliminated with respect to consecutive sentencing for the 
three offenses by Penal Code section 667.6(c). The Siko court disagreed, finding that 
no where in section 667.6 was section 654 expressly mentioned, and reiterated the rule 
that repeal by implication is disfavored. See Siko, 755 P.2d at 296. 
175. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated 
"[n)othing in this language explicitly declares that a conviction for which section 654 
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was stayed only to comply with section 654's mandate that the 
conviction could not be used for any penal purpose. 176 Accord-
ingly, Justice Chin concluded that Benson's assault with intent 
to commit murder conviction, stayed pursuant to section 654, 
should not count as a strike. 177 
Justice Chin agreed with the majority that under Pearson a 
defendant's sentence could not be enhanced based on prior con-
victions which have been stayed pursuant to section 654 unless 
the Legislature explicitly declared that subsequent penal or 
administrative action may be based on the stayed convic-
tions. 178 However, unlike the majority, he argued that nothing 
in the language of the Three Strikes law explicitly declared 
that a conviction for which section 654 prohibited punishment 
could be counted as a separate strike.179 Justice Chin asserted 
that "[t]he mere reference to a stay of execution of sentence is 
not such an explicit declaration. It is not the stay that affects 
[a] conviction's use as a strike; it is section 654."180 Therefore, 
Justice Chin concluded that the language of the Three Strikes 
law was not sufficiently clear to overcome the requirements of 
Pearson. 181 
Justice Chin also criticized the majority's determination 
that language in the Three Strikes law overcame the rule of 
Pearson. 182 The majority stated that the language of the intro-
ductory clause of the Three Strikes law, "[n]otwithstanding any 
other law ... a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined 
as ... " made it clear that the Legislature intended that a defen-
prohibits punishment can be a separate strike." Id. at 568 (citing Pearson, 721 P.2d 
60l). 
176. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 568-569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated 
that: 
It does not violate section 654 to enhance a sentence for a prior conviction 
because the defendant is being punished for recidivism. But it does violate 
that section to enhance a sentence twice, once each for two prior convictions, if 
the convictions arose from the same act within the meaning of the section. 
[d. at 568-569 (citing Pearson, 721 P.2d at 602). 
177. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
178. See id. at 568. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 601. 
179. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 568 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
180. [d. at 569. 
181. See id. at 568. 
182. See id. at 569. 
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dant's sentence could be enhanced based on stayed convic-
tions. l83 Justice Chin disagreed with this interpretation of the 
statute because the language of the Three Strikes law referred 
only to the definition of a qualifying conviction. l84 He main-
tained that nothing in the Three Strikes law mandated that a 
person be punished twice for the same act. l85 Justice Chin con-
cluded that the language of the Three Strikes law could be 
clearer, despite the majority's conclusion that it could not 
"imagine language clearer or more unequivocal. "186 
Justice Chin also criticized the majority's reliance on the in-
tent of the legislature and the electorate. 187 The majority de-
termined that the legislature and the electorate intended that 
all serious or violent convictions should count as strikes. l88 He 
contended that the legislative analysis of the Assembly Bill did 
not demonstrate that the legislature and the electorate in-
tended to allow multiple strikes for a single act. 189 Justice Chin 
noted that the majority should not have relied on information 
from the Assembly Bill because it did not apply to Benson's 
case. l90 Justice Chin argued that even the example used in the 
183. Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
184. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b) (West Supp. 1999). The relevant 
portions of section 1170.12 provide that: 
[d. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for the purposes of this 
section, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as ... (1) Any offense 
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense 
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state ... 
None of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a prior 
conviction is a prior felony ... (A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or 
sentence. (B) The stay of execution of sentence. 
185. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated that 
this language "falls far short of an explicit declaration that the Three Strikes law has 
abrogated the fundamental promise that section 654 has made for over a century that a 
person will not be punished twice for the same act." [d. 
186. Benson, 954 P.2d at 560, 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated that if 
the Legislature and the electorate had really intended to allow multiple strikes for a 
single act, the language could have been more explicit. For example, the Three Strikes 
law could have stated: "Multiple convictions arising out of the same act or omission 
shall be multiple strikes." [d. at 569 n.2. 
187. See id. at 569. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
190. See id. Justice Chin stated that the report was relevant to People v. Fuhrman, 
941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997), that was brought and tried separately from Benson. See id. 
The Fuhrman court considered the legislature's intent in determining whether prior 
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Assembly Bill report, a crime of violence against multiple vic-
tims, did not apply to Benson, as section 654 did not prohibit 
multiple punishment against multiple victims. 191 
3. Unfavorable Consequences of the Majority Decision 
Justice Chin predicted that unfavorable consequences would 
arise from the majority decision. l92 Under Benson, Chin ar-
gued, a defendant could receive three strikes from a single in-
cident. l93 To illustrate his point, Justice Chin gave an example 
of a person who stops a pedestrian at knifepoint, and demands 
a watch. l94 Based on such an act, a person could be convicted of 
false imprisonment, assault with a deadly weapon, and at-
tempted robbery. 195 Each statutory violation would count as a 
felony because a deadly weapon is involved. l96 Hypothetically, 
that person could have three strikes stemming from this one 
incident, because each felony would qualify as a strike. l97 Jus-
tice Chin stated that while trial judges might dismiss the ex-
cess convictions in order to avoid multiple strikes, dismissal 
was not the appropriate solution because the purpose of section 
654 was to avoid dismissal. l98 Thus, Justice Chin argued that 
the stayed convictions should be preserved for the chance that 
the conviction for which the sentence was actually imposed is 
later dismissed 199 
felony convictions must have been brought and tried separately in order to quali1Y as 
multiple strikes. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1193. 
191. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563. The majority cited the example that -a single act 
of robbery of three people in a store could result in a sentence of 25 years to life. Like· 
wise, one case with two counts of a serious felony would subject the defendant to a life 
sentence for any future felony." [d. (alteration in original). Justice Chin argued that 
that scenario involves a crime of violence against multiple victims. See id. at 569 
(Chin, J., dissenting). 
192. See id. at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
197. See id. 
198. See id. Moreover, Justice Chin stated, the stay procedure has been the prac· 
tice for 30 years. See id. 
199. See id. 
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Justice Chin also attacked the majority's description of sec-
tion 654 as providing the defendant with leniency.200 He stated 
that section 654 had served as a basic and necessary provision 
of California's criminal justice system for over a century, man-
aging to ensure that no person may be punished more than 
once for a single act involving a single victim. 201 He stressed 
that the court was neither lenient in sentencing Benson in 
1980, nor was the court lenient now.202 Instead, Justice Chin 
found Benson's treatment as a two-strike offender to be exces-
sive.203 
4. Interpreting the Three Strikes Law as Allowing One Pun-
ishment for One Act is Consistent with the Purpose of the Three 
Strikes Law and Section 654 
Justice Chin further argued that permitting an exception 
for a stay pursuant to section 654 will not make the Three 
Strikes law's reference to "[t]he stay of execution of sentence" 
meaningless.204 He contended that other types of stays could be 
included within the meaning of the statute.205 As examples, 
Justice Chin referred to a stay granted for probation and also 
to a stay granted when a defendant's appeal is pending.206 Jus-
tice Chin argued that this portion of the Three Strikes law pre-
vented defendants from claiming a conviction was not a strike 
merely because it was stayed.207 Justice Chin asserted that the 
provision was meant to include other types of stays, and that 
200. See id. 
201. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. 
206. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (citing In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998, 1002 (Cal. 
1967)) (Chin, J., dissenting). The Wright court noted these examples in determining 
whether to follow the then new stay procedure created in People v. Niles. See Wright, 
422 P.2d at 1002. Justice Chin also recognized that a stay is permitted if the term 
exceeds statutory limits or to allow defendants to put their affairs in order. See Ben-
son, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
207. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). As an example, Justice 
Chin stated that "if a person is convicted of a serious felony and sentenced to state 
prison, but the court stays the sentence pending appeal, and the person then commits 
another felony, the earlier conviction could qualifY as a strike despite the stay." Id. 
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this interpretation was consistent with the purpose of section 
654.208 
Justice Chin denied the majority's assertion that he was 
rewriting the Three Strikes law to provide that "the stay of 
execution of sentence, except those stays mandated by section 
654" shall count as strikes.209 However, Justice Chin argued 
the ftmdamental principle of section 654 was that a person may 
be punished only once for the same act; the stay was merely a 
procedural tool devised to comply with that principle. 210 This 
stay procedure has existed for almost three decades, and the 
language of the Three Strikes law was not explicit enough to 
change it.211 Instead, he argued the majority transformed the 
Three Strikes law to require that regardless of how a conviction 
was stayed, it would count as a strike.212 
5. Benson's Single Intent Should Preclude Multiple Pun-
ishment Under the Three Strikes Law 
Justice Chin agreed with the majority that a person who 
committed additional violence in the course of committing a 
felony deserved harsher treatment than an individual who 
committed the same felony without the additional violence. 213 
Yet his opinion diverged from the majority's because Justice 
Chin focused on crimes committed with different intents. 214 He 
recognized that section 654 does not prohibit multiple punish-
ment for all crimes committed on one occasion. 215 Rather, mul-
208. See id. 
209. [d. See supra note 115 for the majority's discussion on the dissent's interpre-
tation of section 1170.12(b)(1). 
210. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570-571 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
211. See id. at 570. 
212. See id. at 570-571. Justice Chin stated that "[dlefendant expressly recognizes 
that 'The use of the term "stay" in the three strikes statutes explicitly states that a 
prior may be used as a "strike" even though execution of sentence was stayed.'" How-
ever, Justice Chin agreed with the defendant that "it is not the 'stay' that is at the 
heart of the rule reiterated in Pearson; it is the multiple use of priors arising from a 
single criminal 'act.'" [d. at 571 n.3. 
213. See id. at 57l. 
214. See id. 
215. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 57l. Justice Chin stated that courts have permitted 
multiple punishment for multiple sex crimes against the same victim, for a robbery and 
assault on the same victim, for multiple shots fIred at the same victim, and most im-
portantly he noted, for burglary and rape when the purpose of the burglary was theft. 
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tiple punishment is prohibited for crimes if the perpetrator has 
a single intent.216 He cited the example of Benson's 1979 crimi-
nal act for which he was convicted of burglary and assault with 
intent to commit murder after he stabbed his neighbor over 
twenty times.217 Justice Chin claimed Benson committed no 
"additional" violence during this crime because Benson's intent 
for both the burglary and the assault constituted one act of 
violence on his neighbor. 218 Thus, although a defendant who 
commits "additional" violence with separate intents deserves 
harsher treatment, Justice Chin believed Benson did not de-
serve harsher treatment because his act in 1979 against his 
neighbor involved only one intent. 219 
Finally, Justice Chin agreed with the majority that the 
Three Strikes law provides a defendant with notice that if he or 
she reoffends, the defendant will be treated as a recidivist. 220 
He agreed that the Three Strikes law provided Benson with 
such notice. 221 However, Chin concluded, that although Benson 
should be treated as a recidivist, he should not be punished 
twice for the same act. 222 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The majority erroneously concluded that the language of the 
Three Strikes law was clear. The contention that a stay of exe-
cution of sentence should be more broadly interpreted is sup-
ported by clear statutory language, the legislative history of the 
See id. (citing People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611, 617 (Cal. 1993». In each of these situa-
tions, Justice Chin explained, under Fuhrman, multiple strikes would be allowed. See 
Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting). See Latimer, 858 P.2d at 612. In 
Latimer, the defendant kidnapped a woman, drove her into the desert, and then raped 
her and left her behind. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant could not 
be punished for both the kidnapping and the rape under 654, since the defendant had 
only a single intent and objective. See id. at 616. 
216. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
217. See id. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. 
220. See id. 
221. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
222. See id. Chin stated "[tlhe issue is not whether defendant is a recidivist but 
whether he should be punished twice for the same act. Defendant clearly had a strike 
against him when he stole the cigarettes. The sole question is whether he had two 
strikes. He did not." [d. 
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Three Strikes law, and the history of Penal Code section 654.223 
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on the ballot history of the 
Three Strikes law and legislative intent is confused and inac-
curate. The majority pieced together the language from the 
ballot history in order to support its conclusion, and cited an 
inappropriate example of the application of section 654 in its 
argument.224 In addition, the majority's conclusion that Benson 
deserved a harsher sentence because he committed an addi-
tional act of violence is questionable, as Benson only had the 
intent to commit a single felony. Further, the majority's reli-
ance on dismissal as an alternative to preserving the conviction 
with a stay may result in unwelcome results in the future. Fi-
nally, under the holdings of Benson and Romero, the discretion 
awarded to trial courts may result in inconsistent judgments. 
A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE THREE STRIKES LAw IS NOT 
EXPUCIT 
The majority stated that it could not imagine the language 
of the Three Strikes law to be clearer.225 However, as Justice 
Chin pointed out, it is quite easy to imagine clearer language.226 
Instead of merely stating that the "stay of execution of sen-
tence" shall not affect the determination of what is a qualifying 
strike, the Three Strikes law could provide that "[m]ultiple 
convictions arising out of the same act or omission shall be 
multiple strikes."227 
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
courts should not look beyond the plain meaning of the words 
of the statute to interpret it.228 In addition, Penal Code section 
654 should only yield to the Three Strikes law if the enhance-
ment statute calls for a contrary result in "clear and unambi-
223. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998). 
224. See id. 
225. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The legislature can overcome the mandate of 
section 654 that a defendant can only receive one sentence for convictions arising from 
a single transaction if it explicitly declares that subsequent penal action can be based 
on the stayed convictions. See Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 601 (Cal. 1986). 
226. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
227. [d. 
228. See id. at 560. 
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guous terms."229 However, because the language of the Three 
Strikes law is unclear, the court should have attempted a more 
indepth interpretation and considered the purpose and history 
of section 654.230 Section 654 was enacted to provide a guaran-
tee to all defendants that they would not receive multiple pun-
ishments for a single criminal act, having one objective and one 
intent.231 The Supreme Court had previously struck down a 
similar challenge to section 654's bar to multiple punishment 
because the legislature did not expressly mention the section, 
stating that "repeal by implication is disfavored."232 Yet the 
Benson majority disregarded this rule and defeated section 
654's purpose by enhancing Benson's sentence based on a con-
viction for which he did not receive a sentence.233 
229. MENASTER& RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 31. Critics have argued that the 
Three Strikes law is far from clear and unambiguous that any exception for section 654 
was intended: "[Penal Code sectionl 654 has been around for a long time, and it takes 
very clear language to override it; this is not the situation here." [d. 
230. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
231. See id. at 568. Section 654 mandates that a conviction cannot be used for any 
penal purpose. That section is violated by enhancing a sentence twice with two prior 
convictions if the convictions arose from the same action. See id. See also People v. 
Miller, 558 P.2d 552, 560-561 (Cal. 1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that the 
purpose of section 654, which prohibits double punishment, is to ensure that a defen-
dant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability. The defendant in 
Miller was convicted of robbery in the fIrst degree, burglary in the fIrst degree, and 
assault with a deadly weapon after robbing a jewelry store and shooting the store secu-
rity guard, and received a sentence for each conviction. See id. at 555. The Supreme 
Court reversed, fInding that section 654 precluded the imposition of sentence for the 
assault conviction. The court held that the assault was committed during the same 
course of conduct and against the same victim as in the case of the aggravated burglary 
conviction and the defendant could not be punished for both of those convictions. See 
id. at 56!. 
232. People v. Siko, 755 P.2d 294, 296 (Cal. 1988). In Siko, the prosecution argued 
that section 654's bar to multiple punishment was eliminated with respect to consecu-
tive sentencing for the three offenses by Penal Code section 667.6(c). The Supreme 
Court disagreed, stating that "[als a general rule of statutory construction, of course, 
repeal by implication is disfavored. Such repeal is particularly disfavored when, as 
here, the statute allegedly repealed expresses a legal principle that has been a part of 
our penal jurisprudence for over a century." [d. See supra note 174 for further discus-
sion of Siko. Courts of Appeal have also held that in other situations the Three Strikes 
law did not override section 654. See People v. Martin, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995), holding that section 654 will sometimes bar consecutive sentences on mul-
tiple current convictions. See id. at 779. See also People v. McKee, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
707,710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
233. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565. Benson did not receive a sentence for the assault 
with intent to commit murder conviction, as it was stayed pursuant to section 654. 
However, he did receive a ten-year sentence for the residential burglary charge. See 
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The majority also asserted that the language of the Three 
Strikes law is explicit enough to overcome the rule of Pearson, 
and that subsequent penal or administrative action could be 
based on stayed convictions.234 To overcome the rule from 
Pearson, the Three Strikes law would have to explicitly state 
that sentences stayed under the mandate of section 654 count 
as strikes.235 However, the language of the Three StJikes law is 
not clear and the Legislature did not clearly indicate whether 
sentences could be enhanced based on sentences stayed pursu-
ant to section 654.236 Thus, the language of the Three Strikes 
law is not clear enough to overcome the rule of Pearson, and 
under the current configuration sentences should not be en-
hanced based on convictions that were stayed pursuant to sec-
tion 654.237 . 
Because the Three Strikes law does not explicitly state 
whether convictions that have been stayed under the mandate 
of section 654 should count as strikes, the use of the term 
"stay" in the statute is ambiguous.238 Because the Supreme 
Court has held that an ambiguous statute must be construed in 
favor of the defendant, Benson's assault with intent to commit 
murder conviction should not have counted as a strike. 239 
also Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Dec. 29, 
1997). 
234. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. As the court stated in Pearson, "[w)ithout [an 
explicit] declaration [that subsequent penal action may be based on a conviction stayed 
under section 654], it is clear that section 654 prohibits defendant from being disad· 
vantaged in any way as a result of the stayed convictions." [d. See Pearson, 721 P.2d 
595 (Cal. 1986).. . 
235. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 601. 
236. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 567 (Chin, J., dissenting). The majority's interpreta· 
tion of the Three Strikes law disadvantages Benson, and other similarly situated de-
fendants who have committed a single criminal act and received multiple convictions. 
See id. 
237. See id. 
238. [d. 
239. See People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal. 1986). In Overstreet, the 
word "trial" as used in a sentence enhancement provision for felonies committed while 
released pending trial was ambiguous as to whether it included proceedings following 
determination of guilt prior to sentencing. The Supreme Court found that the ambigu-
ity in the statute had to be construed in favor of the defendant. The court stated that: 
When language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal 
law, the policy of this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the 
defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application reasonably 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/8
1999] THREE STRIKES SENTENCING LAW 617 
B. THE MAJORITY'S RELIANCE ON THE BALLOT HISTORY AND 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS CONFUSED AND INACCURATE 
The majority's conclusion that the ballot history and Legis-
lative intent supported the use of any stayed conviction for 
purposes of a strike is misguided. 240 The majority cited lan-
guage from various congressional hearings and ballot pam-
phlets in support of its finding that the Three Strikes law over-
rides section 654 in specific circumstances. 241 However, it 
seems that the majority pieced the language together to fit its 
conclusion. 242 In addition, the language cited by the majority 
does not clearly indicate that the Legislature or the electorate 
intended to include convictions stayed pursuant to section 654 
within the scope of the Three Strikes law.243 Yet the majority 
permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as 
to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute. Strict 
construction of penal statutes protects the individual against arbitrary 
discretion by officials and judges and guards against judicial usurpation of the 
legislative function which would result from enforcement of penalties when 
the legislative branch did not clearly prescribe them. 
Id. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (med Oct. 29, 
1997). Similarly, since the Three Strikes law was ambiguous as to the fact if a convic-
tion that is stayed pursuant to section 654 can count as a strike, Benson was entitled to 
the benefit of the doubt of the legislature's and electorate's true intent. See id. 
240. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562-563. 
241. See id. See Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Article III Judges and the 
Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1275, 
1284 (1998). The ballot pamphlets themselves have been criticized as having misled 
the public into voting for the electorate version of the Three Strikes law. The literature 
has been attacked because of its reliance on a flawed study prepared by the office of 
California Governor Pete Wilson. The study projected that "three strikes" would save 
billions of dollars. Even more misleading were claims that the law targeted rapists, 
child molesters, and murderers. Yet the study failed to reveal the fact that the Three 
Strikes law would lead to long prison sentences for aging felons convicted of non-violent 
third strike felonies. The public simply did not receive any contrary evidence. See id. 
242. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (quoting Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 
184, as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p.36). The majority quotes 
language from the Ballot Pamphlet for Proposition 184 that "Islerious or violent convic-
tions committed before 1994 are counted as strikes." Id. Yet this language came later 
in the argument in favor of Proposition 184. Directly before this statement was the 
story of Kimber Reynolds, the daughter of Mike Reynolds that was viciously murdered 
by a "career criminal. n The argument went on to state that "3 Strikes keeps career 
criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars 
where they belong." Id. Yet the argument failed to state that persons who receive 
several convictions from one incident, some of which are stayed to avoid multiple pun-
ishment, will count as strikes. Voters were simply not given the information or the 
opportunity to make this decision, and instead were given examples of extreme crimi-
nal behavior. See id. 
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presumed that although the intent was not specified, all previ-
ous serious or violent felony convictions count as strikes even 
when the convictions were stayed pursuant to section 654.244 
Justice Chin correctly recognized the inaccuracy of the ex-
ample cited by the majority in support of its argument that the 
legislature and the electorate intended to include convictions 
stayed pursuant to section 654 as strikes.245 The majority's ex-
ample was that a "single act of robbery of three people in a 
store would subject the defendant to a life sentence for any fu-
ture felony. »246 However, this example involves a crime of vio-
lence against multiple victims, not convictions stayed pursuant 
to section 654.247 Section 654 does not prohibit multiple pun-
ishment for multiple victim crimes, and it does not apply to the 
court's example. 248 
C. BENSON DID NOT COMMIT AN ADDITIONAL ACT OF 
VIOLENCE 
In Benson, the majority stated that Benson deserved to be 
"treated more harshly" because he committed an additional act 
of violence during the 1979 incident with his neighbor. 249 How-
ever, Justice Chin correctly noted that Benson did not commit 
243. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562·563 (quoting Analysis by the Legis. Analyst, p. 
33). The majority also quoted analysis by the Legislative Analyst, which also accom· 
panied Proposition 184 that "[ilf the person has two or more previous serious or violent 
felony convictions, the mandatory sentence for any new felony conviction is life impris· 
onment." [d. Yet nothing in this language addresses convictions stayed pursuant to 
section 654. 
244. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562-563. 
245. See id. at 569. 
246. [d. at 562 (quoting Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 971 Feb. 17, 1994, 1993-1994 
Regular Session). 
247. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). If a defendant commits a 
crime of violence against different individual victims, he or she can be sentenced for 
each act on each person. See id. See People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611, 617 (Cal. 1993). 
Section 654 only applies when the defendant's crimes constituted one act. See supra 
note 215 for facts and holding of Latimer. 
248. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
249. Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. The majority stated that "the electorate and the 
Legislature rationally could-and did-<:onclude that a person who committed addi-
tional violence in the course of a prior serious felony ... should be treated more harshly 
than an individual who committed the same initial felony, but whose criminal conduct 
did not include such additional violence." [d. 
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an additional act of violence.250 Instead, Benson's acts against 
his neighbor constituted one act of violence. 251 The burglary 
was for the purpose of committing an assault, not for a differ-
ent purpose, such as theft.252 Under California's single feloni-
ous purpose doctrine, when the entry would be non-felonious 
but for the intent to commit the assault, and the assault is an 
integral part of the burglary, the defendant has committed only 
a single act.253 
Applying this doctrine to Benson, the elements of the bur-
glary were the same as those of the assault. 2M The felony in-
tent that was used to prove the burglary conviction was the 
intent to commit the assault on the victim, leaving Benson only 
with the intent to commit a single felony.2M Benson's entry into 
his neighbor's apartment would have been non-felonious but for 
the intent to commit the murder.256 Therefore, Benson had no 
criminal intent separate from the assault itself, and committed 
only one act of violence. 257 
D. DISMISSAL IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION WHEN 
THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED Two OFFENSES IN A SINGLE ACT 
In rejecting the argument that dramatic and harsh results 
will ensue from interpreting the Three Strikes law as qualify-
250. See Benson,.954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
251. See id. 
252. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct. 
29,1997). 
253. See People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886 (Cal. 1984). In Smith, the defendant was 
convicted of second-degree murder, felony child abuse, and child beating after she re-
peatedly assaulted her two-year-old daughter until she died. See id. at 888. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that since the acts constituting the child abuse were an 
integral part of the child's death, the felony child abuse offense merged into the homi-
cide and could not serve as the underlying felony to support the conviction for second-
degree murder under a felony-murder theory. See id. at 888-891. The court also rec-
ognized that although this case involved felony-murder, subsequent decisions have 
applied the single felonious purpose rule to other felonies involving assault or assault 
with a deadly weapon. See id. See People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969) (involving 
burglary with intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon). 
254. Burglary requires that a defendant have an intention to commit a felony. See 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 8.13 (2d ed. 1986). 
255. See Smith, 678 P.2d at 890-89l. 
256. See id. 
257. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct. 
29,1997). 
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ing convictions stayed pursuant to section 654 as strikes, the 
majority mentioned in a footnote that a trial court is free to 
dismiss a prior conviction under Penal Code section 1385.258 
Thus, the court implied that it might be an abuse of discretion 
for a judge not to dismiss a conviction stayed under section 654 
when multiple convictions arise from a single act.259 However, 
as Justice Chin argued, dismissal is not the appropriate solu-
tion.260 Stayed convictions should be preserved in the event 
that the conviction for which the punishment was imposed is 
set aside for any reason.261 Otherwise, the defendant may re-
ceive a windfall and withstand no punishment at all. 262 As 
suggested by Justice Chin, if the result of Benson's holding is 
that courts entirely dismiss convictions governed by section 
654, the prosecution may come to regret its victory.263 The re-
sult of a Penal Code section 1385 dismissal of a conviction is 
that "[t]he defendant stands as if he had never been prosecuted 
for the charged offense.''264 Dismissal will thus defeat the pur-
pose of the sentence enhancement statute. 
E. UNDER THE HOLDINGS OF BENSON AND ROMERO, THE 
DISCRETION AWARDED TO TRIAL COURTS MAy RESULT IN 
INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS 
Two years before Benson, in People v. Romero,265 the same 
court held that a trial court may, on its own motion, strike 
prior felony conviction allegations in the "interest of justice."266 
258. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. 
259. See id. See Alex Ricciardulli, Three Strikes and Form Motion Update, 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT CASES SINCE LAsT PDQ, 1 (1998). Although Benson has 
allowed convictions stayed under Penal Code section 654 to count as strikes, all hope is 
not lost. A court can still dismiss a conviction under Penal Code section 1385. A court 
may even abuse its discretion if it does not dismiss the prior conviction. Furthermore, 
there are constitutional due process concerns underlying Penal Code section 654, which 
the Three Strikes law cannot override that may prevent multiple strikes. See id. 
260. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
261. See id. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. Ricciardulli, supra note 259, at 2 (quoting People v. Alvarez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
814, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part 928 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1997). The court held 
that the result of a 1385 dismissal is that "[t)he defendant stanqs as if he had never 
been prosecuted for the charged offense." [d. 
265. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
266. Romero, 917 P.2d at 630. 
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The Benson and Romero holdings change the whole landscape 
of the Three Strikes law because the trial court has discretion 
as to whether they should follow the sentencing guidelines 
adopted by the Legislature and the electorate. 267 On one hand, 
Romero makes it easier for recidivists to avoid an indetermi-
nate life sentence prescribed by the Three Strikes law by 
granting the trial court judge discretion to dismiss a qualifying 
strike.268 Yet, on the other hand, Benson grants a trial court 
discretion to count a sentence stayed under Penal Code section 
654 as a strike, making it harder on recidivists. 269 Thus, the 
range of penalties may increase dramatically. 270 
This situation is problematic because the Legislature and 
the electorate may not have intended the court to have discre-
tion to dismiss priors, or may not have intended that a stayed 
conviction under section 654 should count as a strike. 271 Even 
more uncertain is whether the Legislature and the electorate 
intended for trial courts to have this much latitude in sentenc-
ing.272 
Due to a trial court's discretion, sentences may become in-
consistent among the California courts, thereby frustrating 
uniform determinate sentencing goals.273 Because the Romero 
267. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University 
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998). See Cal. Ct. Rule 428(a) (West 
Supp. 1999). The California court rule setting forth the criteria for a judge to deter-
mine whether or not to impose enhancement states: "If the judge has statutory discre-
tion to strike the additional term for an enhancement, the court may consider and 
apply any of the circumstances in mitigation enumerated in these rules or, pursuant to 
rule 408, any other reasonable circumstances in mitigation that are present." [d. 
268. See Romero, 917 P.2d 628. 
269. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557. 
270. See Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role of Discretion in the 
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 257 (1998) (recognizing that dis-
cretion can enable participants in the criminal justice system to nullify legitimately 
adopted sentencing laws and to impose inequitable sentences based on irrelevant char-
acteristics of defendants and crimes). 
271. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University 
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998). 
272. See id. 
273. See Kessler & Morrison Piehl, supra note 270, at 257. See Assembly Commit-
tee on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary, 
Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal Review, 199-1998 Legis., June 3D, 1998 
(statement of Judith M. Garvey). The legislature has also been concerned with the 
amount of discretion given to the trial court. As argued in a California Assembly 
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decision did not derme what reasons justify dismissing strikes, 
and Benson did not set guidelines on why a trial court should 
count a stayed conviction under section 654 as a strike, the se-
verity of sentences could greatly differ among defendants. 274 In 
light of this unwieldy discretion, different defendants under 
similar circumstances could potentially receive two completely 
different sentences. 275 
For example, a defendant with two strikes based on prior 
convictions for robbery and residential burglary, who commits 
another residential burglary must spend twenty-five years in 
prison before being eligible for parole.276 Another defendant in 
the same circumstances may have the first residential burglary 
dismissed because that the trial judge deemed it to be in the 
interest of justice. 277 The second defendant would only have 
two strikes under the Three Strikes law and could be sentenced 
to thirteen years in prison.278 Accordingly, under the court's 
interpretation of the Three Strikes law and the discretion given 
to the trial court, two defendants in the same circumstances 
who committed the same crimes could have sentences differing 
by twelve years.279 
Committee on Public Safety in determining whether to limit what can count as a strike 
to strictly felonies that are considered serious or violent: 
[d. 
Selective enforcement of the law is an ever·present risk, and the risks become 
more significant when a life sentence can result from a non·violent offense. 
Recent studies by the Judicial Council point out how proceedings sometimes 
reflect the biases and prejudices of the larger society. Although prosecutors 
have formed internal review procedures to reduce the chances that the law is 
applied selectively, some panels conducting these reviews have little or no 
representation. 
274. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Cffilden Gate University 
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998). 
275. See Pressman & Kaae, supra note 53, at 37. 
276. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 114. See supra note 47 for 
explanation of the calculated sentence. 
277. See Pressman & Kaae, supra note 53, at 33. 
278. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 11I. 
279. See id. at 114. 
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VII. RAMIFICATIONS OF BENSON 
Since its enactment in 1994, the Three Strikes Law has 
been subject to much criticism and debate.280 Many critics 
claim that the law is ineffective in deterring violent crime and 
clogs the court system.281 The opposition to Three Strikes laws 
illustrates the dangers of relinquishing judicial discretion. 282 
However, there are those who believe that this is exactly how 
justice ought to be carried out.283 Many Three Strikes support-
ers are average Americans who are troubled by the prospect of 
criminals returning to the streets after serving light sen-
tences.284 They view judicial discretion in sentencing as some-
thing that is "just not working. "2B5 Others simply believe that 
individual judges are cursed with many of the same biases and 
prejudices as others in society.286 In their view, removing the 
power to sentence from the hands of one judge and placing it in 
the hands of the legislature creates a more balanced approach 
to punishment. 287 Despite this apparent judicial hand-tying, 
the power to dismiss a prior strike offense remains a "discre-
tionary weapon in the trial judge's arsenal.»288 
Justice Chin suggests that the majority's decision will result 
in unfavorable consequences. 289 Although the exact conse-
quences are not known yet, the Benson holding is sure to affect 
280. See supra note 32 for discussion on recent movements to change the Three 
Strikes law to only enhance sentences based on violent or serious felonies, rather than 
other subsequent felonies. See also supra note 53 for discussion on the claims made by 
critics that many offenders are receiving irrationally long sentences, even though they 
did not commit violent or serious offenses. 
281. See supra note 54 for discussion on how the Three Strikes law clogs both the 
prisons and the court systems. 
282. See Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes And You're Out": The Solution To 
The Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 120 n.12 (1996) (citing 
Edwin E. Meese III, Three Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, INSIGHT, May 1994, at 
20, to support the proposition that citizens generally do not trust discretionary sen-
tencing laws). 
283. See McClain, supra note 282, at 120 n.12. 
284. See Daponde, supra note 53, at 556 (determining that Chapter 160, which 
makes a strike for a parolee equivalent to that of a felon on probation, hinders judicial 
discretion). 
285. [d. 
286. See McClain, supra note 282, at 120 n.12. 
287. See id. 
288. Daponde, supra note 53, at 556. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 628. 
289. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
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scores of recidivist criminals throughout California.290 Multiple 
convictions often arise out of a single act, potentially resulting 
in three strikes from one incident. 291 Under the Benson ruling, 
the trial court could choose not to count all of the convictions 
stayed under section 654 as strikes.292 Under Romero, however, 
the court could also elect to dismiss one or more of the convic-
tions in the interest of justice.293 Thus, that defendant could 
potentially end up with a wide variety of sentences, depending 
on how the trial court exercises its discretion. Either way, the 
defendant may receive a punishment that does n.ot fit the 
crime. 294 One can only ask is this what the voters really in-
tended? 
VIII. CONCLUSION . 
The majority in Benson concluded that, in light of the decla-
ration in the Three Strikes law, a stay of execution of sentence 
would not affect the determination of what constitutes a strike. 
Therefore, Benson's two prior felony convictions from the 1979 
incident qualified as strikes.295 The majority found this conclu-
sion to be consistent with the voters' expressed intent.296 The 
California Supreme Court then affirmed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, but remanded the case to the trial court for 
resentencing, because the trial court had discretion :in striking 
a prior conviction allegation.297 The court stated that it ex-
pressed no opinion as to how a trial court should exercise that 
discretion.298 
290. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A. 
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI. 
291. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
292. See id. at 558. See Dolan, supra note 290, at AI. 
293. See Romero, 917 P.2d 628. 
294. See supra note 133 for an example of an act that may result in three strikes. 
See Steve Lawrence, Lawmakers Refuse to Narrow List of Felonies for '3 Strikes,' THE 
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 5,1997, at A4. 
295. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 564 (Cal. 1998). 
296. See id. 
297. See id. As the California Supreme Court held in Romero, the trial court has 
the discretion to strike a prior conviction allegation in the "interest of justice" pursuant 
to Penal Code section 1385. [d. 
298. See id. 
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Yet it remains questionable whether the legislature and 
voters really intended for a single act that may only be pun-
ished once may generate two strikes.299 Allowing a smgle 
criminal act with one intent to result in two strikes defeats 
both the historY and purpose of section 654.300 After the Su-
preme Court decisions in Benson and Romero trial courts are 
encouraged to dismiss prior conviction allegations in order to 
avoid multiple punishment for a single act. 301 The discretion 
granted to trial courts by these two cases opens the door for 
unfair sentences that will clog both the prisons and the appel-
late COurtS.302 Only time will tell if California courts and its 
citizens will ultimately suffer from the reasoning of the Benson 
decision. 
Dawn Philippus * 
299. See Interview with Russell Babcock, Attorney for Appellant Benson (Jan. 27, 
1999). 
300. See supra notes 225-239 for critique of how the Benson court's interpretation of 
the Three Strikes law defeats the history and purpose of Penal Code section 654. 
301. See supra note 151 and the accompanying text for the court's analysis of how a 
strike should be dismissed if it is in the interests of justice. 
302. See id. 
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